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Abstract. We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of
transitivity, by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults,
in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent
p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent
imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of con-
ditional events. Finally, we prove the coherent probability propagation
rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns
by proving the p-entailment for the associated knowledge bases.
1 Motivation and outline
While Transitivity is basic for reasoning, it does not hold in nonmonotonic rea-
soning systems. Therefore, various patterns of Weak Transitivity were studied
in the literature (e.g., [9]). In probabilistic approaches, Transitivity is proba-
bilistically non-informative, i.e., the premise probabilities, p(C|B), p(B|A), do
not constrain the probability of the conclusion p(C|A) (for instance, the exten-
sion p(C|A) = z of the assessment p(C|B) = 1, p(B|A) = 1 is coherent for any
z ∈ [0, 1]; see [17,18]). In this paper, we study probabilistically informative ver-
sions of Transitivity in the setting of coherence ([3,6,12]). Transitivity has also
been studied in [5,8]; among other differences, in our approach we use imprecise
probabilities in the setting of coherence, where conditioning events may have
zero probability.
After introducing some notions of coherence for set-valued probability assess-
ments (Sect. 2), we present probabilistic interpretations of defaults and negated
defaults (Sect. 3). We represent a sequence of defaults and/or negated defaults
(knowledge base) by an imprecise probability assessment on the associated se-
quence of conditional events. Moreover, we generalize definitions of p-consistency
and p-entailment. In Sect. 4 we prove the coherent probability propagation rules
for Weak Transitivity (Theorem 3). We then exploit Theorem 3 to demonstrate
the validity of selected patterns of (weak) transitive inferences involving defaults
and negated defaults by proving the p-entailment for the corresponding knowl-
edge bases (Sect. 5).
2 Imprecise probability assessments
Given two events E and H , with H 6= ⊥, the conditional event E|H is defined
as a three-valued logical entity which is true if EH (i.e., E ∧ H) is true, false
if ¬EH is true, and void if H is false. Given a finite sequence of n ≥ 1 condi-
tional events F = (E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn), we denote by P any precise probability
assessment P = (p1, . . . , pn) on F , where pj = p(Ej |Hj) ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, we denote by Π the set of all coherent precise assessments on F . The
coherence-based probabilistic approach has been adopted by many authors (see
e.g., [3,6,10,13,14,16,17]); in this paper, due to the lack of space, we do not insert
the basic notions on coherence. We recall that when there are no logical relations
among the events E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn involved in F , that is E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn
are logically independent, then the set Π associated with F is the whole unit
hypercube [0, 1]n. If there are logical relations, then the set Π could be a strict
subset of [0, 1]n. As is well known Π 6= ∅; therefore, ∅ 6= Π ⊆ [0, 1]n.
Definition 1. An imprecise, or set-valued, assessment I on a family of condi-
tional events F is a (possibly empty) set of precise assessments P on F .
Definition 1, introduced in [11], states that an imprecise (probability) assessment
I on a given family F of n conditional events is just a (possibly empty) subset
of [0, 1]n. Given an imprecise assessment I we denote by Ic the complementary
imprecise assessement of I, i.e. Ic = [0, 1]n \ I.
Definition 2. Let be given a sequence of n conditional events F . An imprecise
assessment I ⊆ [0, 1]n on F is g-coherent if and only if there exists a coherent
precise assessment P on F such that P ∈ I.
Definition 3. Let I be a subset of [0, 1]n. For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the pro-
jection ρj(I) of I onto the j-th coordinate, is defined as
ρj(I) = {xj ∈ [0, 1] : pj = xj , for some (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ I}.
Definition 4. An imprecise assessment I on a sequence of n conditionals event
F is coherent if and only if, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for every xj ∈ ρj(I),
there exists a coherent precise assessment P = (p1, . . . , pn) on F , such that
P ∈ I and pj = xj.
Definition 5. [11, Definition 2] An imprecise assessment I on F is totally
coherent if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) I is non-
empty; (ii) if P ∈ I, then P is a coherent precise assessment on F .
Remark 1. We observe that:
I is g-coherent ⇐⇒ Π ∩ I 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ ρj(Π ∩ I) 6= ∅, ∀j = 1, . . . , n ;
I is coherent ⇐⇒ ∅ 6= ρj(Π ∩ I) = ρj(I), ∀j = 1, . . . , n ;
I is totally coherent ⇐⇒ ∅ 6= Π ∩ I = I .
Then, the following relations among the different notions of coherence hold:
I totally coherent ⇒ I coherent ⇒ I g-coherent .
Definition 6. Let I be a non-empty subset of [0, 1]n. For each sub-vector
(j1, j2, . . . , jm) of (1, 2, . . . , n), the projection ρ(j1,j2,...,jm)(I) of I onto the coor-
dinates (j1, . . . , jm), with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, is defined as
ρ(j1,...,jm)(I) =
{(xj1 , . . . , xjm) ∈ [0, 1]
m : pj = xj , j = j1, . . . , jm, for some (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ I }.
Let I be an imprecise assessment on the sequence F =
(E1|H1, E2|H2, . . . , En|Hn); moreover, let En+1|Hn+1 be a further condi-
tional event and let J ⊆ [0, 1]n+1 an imprecise assessment on (F , En+1|Hn+1).
We say that J is an extension of I to (F , En+1|Hn+1) iff ρ(1,2,...,n)(J ) = I, that
is: (i) for every (p1, . . . , pn, pn+1) ∈ J , it holds that (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ I; (ii) for
every (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ I, there exists pn+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that (p1, . . . , pn, pn+1) ∈ J .
Definition 7. Let I be a g-coherent assessment on F =
(E1|H1, E2|H2, . . . , En|Hn); moreover, let En+1|Hn+1 be a further condi-
tional event and let J be an extension of I to (F , En+1|Hn+1). We say that J
is a g-coherent extension of I if and only if J is g-coherent.
Theorem 1. Given a g-coherent assessment I ⊆ [0, 1]n on F , let En+1|Hn+1
be a further conditional event. Then, there exists a g-coherent extension J ⊆
[0, 1]n+1 of I to the family (F , En+1|Hn+1).
Proof. As I is g-coherent, there exists a coherent precise assessment P =
(p1, . . . , pn) on F , with P ∈ I. Then, as is well known (FTP), there exists
(a non-empty interval) [p′, p′′] ⊆ [0, 1] such that (P , pn+1) is a coherent precise
assessment on F ∪ {En+1|Hn+1}, for every pn+1 ∈ [p′, p′′]. Now, let be given
any Γ ⊆ [0, 1] such that Γ ∩ [p′, p′′] 6= ∅; moreover, let us consider the extension
J = I × Γ . Clearly, (P , pn+1) ∈ J for every pn+1 ∈ Γ ∩ [p′, p′′]; moreover the
assessment (P , pn+1) on (F , En+1|Hn+1) is coherent for every pn+1 ∈ Γ ∩[p′, p′′].
Finally, J is a g-coherent extension of I to (F , En+1|Hn+1).
Given a g-coherent assessment I on a sequence of n conditional events F , for
each coherent precise assessment P on F , with P ∈ I, we denote by [αP , βP ]
the interval of coherent extensions of P to En+1|Hn+1; that is, the assessment
(P , pn+1) on (F , En+1|Hn+1) is coherent if and only if pn+1 ∈ [αP , βP ]. Then,
defining the set
Σ =
⋃
P∈Π∩I [αP , βP ] , (1)
for every pn+1 ∈ Σ, the assessment I × {pn+1} is a g-coherent extension of I to
(F , En+1|Hn+1); moreover, for every pn+1 ∈ [0, 1]\Σ, the extension I×{pn+1} of
I to (F , En+1|Hn+1) is not g-coherent. Thus, denoting by Π
′ the set of coherent
precise assessments on (F , En+1|Hn+1), it holds that Σ is the projection onto the
(n+1)-th coordinate of the set (I×[0, 1])∩Π ′, that is ρn+1((I×[0, 1])∩Π ′) = Σ.
We say that Σ is the set of coherent extensions of the imprecise assessment I
on F to the conditional event En+1|Hn+1.
3 Probabilistic knowledge bases and entailment
The sentence “E is a plausible consequence of H ,” where E is an event and
H is a not self-contradictory event, is a default, which we denote by H |∼ E.
Moreover, we denote a negated default, ¬(H |∼ E), by H |∼/ E (it is not the case,
that: E is a plausible consequence of H). We denote by s a default or a negated
default, which are defined in terms of probabilistic assessments as follows:
Definition 8. H |∼ E holds iff p(E|H) = 1. H |∼/ E holds iff p(E|H) 6= 1.
Given two events E and H , with H 6= ⊥, by coherence p(E|H) + p(¬E|H) = 1
(which holds in general). Thus, the probabilistic interpretation of the following
types of sentences H |∼ E (I), H |∼ ¬E (II), H |∼/ E (III), and H |∼/ ¬E (IV), can
be represented in terms of imprecise assessments on E|H (Table 1). In this paper
Type Sentence Probabilistic interpretation Assessment I on E|H
I H |∼ E p(E|H) = 1 {1}
II H |∼ ¬E p(¬E|H) = 1 {0}
III H |∼/ E p(E|H) < 1 [0, 1[
IV H |∼/ ¬E p(¬E|H) < 1 ]0, 1]
Table 1: Probabilistic interpretations of defaults (types I and II) and negated
defaults (types III and IV), and their respective (imprecise) assessments I on a
conditional event E|H .
a knowledge base K is defined as a (non-empty) finite sequence of defaults and
negated defaults. Let K = (H1 |∼ E1, . . . , Hn |∼ En, D1 |∼/ C1, . . . , Dm |∼/ Cm) be
a knowledge base, with n + m ≥ 1. The pair (FK, IK), where FK is the or-
dered family of conditional events (E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn, C1|D1, . . . , Cm|Dm) and
IK is the imprecise assessment×ni=1{1} ××
m
j=1
[0, 1[ on FK. Thus, we define our
probabilistic representation of the knowledge base K by the corresponding pair
(FK, IK). We now define the notion of p-consistency of a given knowledge base
in terms of g-coherence.
Definition 9. A knowledge base K is p-consistent if and only if the imprecise
assessment IK on FK is g-coherent.
By coherence, any (non-empty) sub-sequence S of a p-consistent knowledge base
K is also a p-consistent knowledge base. We define the notion of p-entailment
of a (negated) default from a p-consistent knowledge base in terms of coherent
extension of a g-coherent assessment.
Definition 10. Let K be p-consistent. K p-entails A |∼ B (resp., A |∼/ B), de-
noted by K |=p A |∼ B (resp., K |=p A |∼/ B), iff the (non-empty) set of coherent
extensions to B|A of IK on FK is {1} (resp., a subset of [0, 1[ ).
Theorem 2. Let K be p-consistent. K |=p A |∼ B (resp., K |=p A |∼/ B), iff there
exists a (non-empty) sub-sequence S of K: S |=p A |∼ B (resp., S |=p A |∼/ B).
Proof. (⇒) Trivially, by setting S = K.
(⇐) Assume that S |=p A |∼ B (resp., A |∼/ B). Then, for every precise coherent
assessment P ∈ IS on FS , if the extension (P , z) on (FS , B|A) is coherent, then
z = 1 (resp., z 6= 1). Let P ′ ∈ IK be a coherent precise assessment on FK. For
reductio ad absurdum we assume that the extension (P ′, z) on (FK, B|A) is co-
herent with z ∈ [0, 1[ (resp., z = 1). Then, the sub-assessment (P , z) of (P ′, z) on
(FS , B|A) is coherent with z ∈ [0, 1[ (resp., z = 1): this contradicts S |=p A |∼ B
(resp., S |=p A |∼/ B). Therefore, K |=p A |∼ B (resp., K |=p A |∼/ B). ⊓⊔
A similar approach has been developed in [6, Definition 26]. We observe that if
the knowledge base K consists of defaults only, then definitions 9 and 10 coincide
with the notion of p-consistency and p-entailment, respectively, investigated from
a coherence perspective in [12] (see also [4,13]). Moreover, p-entailment of the
well known inference rules of the nonmonotonic System P has been studied in
this context (e.g., [6,10], see also [2,7]).
Remark 2. By Table 1 the probabilistic interpretation of K =
(H1 |∼ E1, . . . , Hn |∼ En, D1 |∼/ C1, . . . , Dm |∼/ Cm) can equivalently be
represented by IK = ×ni=1{1} ××
m
j=1
]0, 1] on FK = (E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn,
¬C1|D1, . . . ,¬Cm|Dm). Definitions 9 and 10 can be rewritten accordingly.
Example 1. Given three logically independent events A,B,C, with A 6= ⊥, any
assessment (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 on (C|A,B|A) is of course coherent. Furthermore,
the extension z = P (C|AB) of (x, y) on (C|A,B|A) is coherent if and only if
z ∈ [z′, z′′], where ([10])
z′ =
{
x+y−1
y
> 0, if x+ y > 1,
0, if x+ y ≤ 1,
z′′ =
{
x
y
< 1, if x < y,
1, if x ≥ y .
Then, we have (see also [6,9]): (A |∼ C,A |∼ B) |=p AB |∼ C (Cautious Mono-
tonicity); (A |∼/ C,A |∼/ ¬B) |=p AB |∼/ C (Rational Monotonicity).
4 Weak Transitivity: Propagation of probability bounds
In this section we compute the interval [z′, z′′] of the coherent extensions
z = p(C|A) of any coherent assessment (x, y, t) ∈ [0, 1]3 on (C|B,B|A,A|A ∨B)
to C|A, by applying the Algorithm 2 given in [3]. The algorithm’s outputs p0
and p0 will be denoted by z′ and z′′, respectively.
Remark 3. Let A,B,C be logically independent events. It can be proved that the
assessment (x, y, t) on F = (C|B,B|A,A|A ∨B) is coherent for every (x, y, t) ∈
[0, 1]3, that is the imprecise assessment I = [0, 1]3 on F is totally coherent. Also
I = [0, 1]3 on F ′ = (C|B,B|A,C|A) is totally coherent.4
Computation of the lower probability bound z′ on C|A
Input: n = 3, Fn = (E1|H1, E2|H2, E3|H3) = (C|B,B|A,A|A ∨ B), An =
([α1, β1], [α2, β2], [α3, β3]) = ([x, x], [y, y], [t, t]), En+1|Hn+1 = C|A.
Step 0. The constituents associated with (Fn, En+1|Hn+1) = (C|B,B|A,A|(A∨
B), C|A) and contained in H0 =
∨n+1
i=1 Hi = A ∨ B are C1 = ABC ,C2 =
4 For proving total coherence of I on F (resp., F ′) it is sufficient to check that the
assessment {0, 1}3 on F (resp., F ′) is totally coherent ([11, Theorem 7]), i.e, each
of the eight vertices of the unit cube is coherent. Coherence can be checked, for
example, by applying Algorithm 1 of [11] or by the CkC-package [1].
AB¬C ,C3 = A¬BC ,C4 = A¬B¬C ,C5 = ¬ABC , and C6 = ¬AB¬C. We
construct the following starting system with unknowns λ1, . . . , λ6, z = pn+1:

λ1 + λ3 = z(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4),
λ1 + λ5 = x(λ1 + λ2 + λ5 + λ6),
λ1 + λ2 = y(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4),
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = t(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6),
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6 .
(2)
Step 1. We set z = 0 in System (2) and obtain


λ1 + λ3 = 0,
λ5 = x(λ2 + λ5 + λ6),
λ2 = y(λ2 + λ4),
λ2 + λ4 = t,
λ2 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1,
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6 ;
⇐⇒


λ1 = λ3 = 0,
λ2 = yt,
λ4 = t(1− y),
λ5 = x(yt+ 1− t),
λ6 = (1− t)(1 − x)− xyt,
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6 .
(3)
As (x, y, t) ∈ [0, 1]3, we observe that: yt ≥ 0, t(1 − t) ≥ 0, and x(yt + 1 − t) ≥
0. Thus, System (3) is solvable if and only if xyt ≤ (1 − t)(1 − x), that is
t(1 − x + xy) ≤ 1 − x. We distinguish two cases: (i) t(1 − x + xy) > 1 − x; (ii)
t(1− x+ xy) ≤ 1− x. In Case (i), System (3) is not solvable and—according to
the algorithm—we proceed to Step 2. In Case (ii), System (3) is solvable and
we go to Step 3.
Case (i).We take Step 2 and consider the following linear programming problem:
Compute z′ = min(λ1 + λ3) subject to:


λ1 + λ5 = x(λ1 + λ2 + λ5 + λ6), λ1 + λ2 = y(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4),
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = t(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6),
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 1, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6.
(4)
As t(1− x+ xy) > 1− x ≥ 0, it holds that t > 0. In this case, the constraints in
(4) can be rewritten in the following way


λ1 + λ5 = x
(
y + 1−t
t
)
,
λ1 + λ2 = y,
λ5 + λ6 =
1−t
t
,
λ3 + λ4 = 1− y,
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6,
⇐⇒


λ5 = xy + x
1−t
t
− λ1,
λ2 = y − λ1,
λ6 =
1−t
t
− xy − x1−t
t
+ λ1,
λ4 = 1− y − λ3,
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6.
that is 

max
{
0, xy − (1−t)(1−x)
t
}
≤ λ1 ≤ min
{
y, xy + x1−t
t
}
,
λ2 = y − λ1, 0 ≤ λ3 ≤ 1− y, λ4 = 1− y − λ3,
λ5 = xy + x
1−t
t
− λ1, λ6 =
(1−t)(1−x)
t
− xy + λ1.
(5)
As t(1−x+xy) > 1−x ≥ 0, it holds that xy−(1−x)(1−t)/t > 0. Thus, we obtain
the minimum of (λ1 + λ3) subject to (5) at (λ
′
1, λ
′
3) = (xy − (1− t)(1 − x)/t, 0).
The procedure stops yielding as output z′ = λ′1 + λ
′
3 = xy− (1− t)(1− x)/t > 0.
Case (ii). We take Step 3 of the algorithm. We denote by Λ and S the vector
of unknowns (λ1, . . . , λ6) and the set of solution of System (3), respectively.
By recalling the conditioning events H1 = B,H2 = H4 = A,H3 = A ∨ B, we
consider the following linear functions and their maxima in S:
Φ1(Λ) =
∑
r:Cr⊆B
λr = λ1 + λ2 + λ5 + λ6,
Φ2(Λ) = Φ4(Λ) =
∑
r:Cr⊆A
λr = λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4,
Φ3(Λ) =
∑
r:Cr⊆A∨B
λr = λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 ,
Mi = maxΛ∈S Φi(Λ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 .
(6)
From System (3), we obtain: Φ1(Λ) = yt + 1 − t, Φ2(Λ) = Φ4(Λ) = t, and
Φ3(Λ) = 1, ∀Λ ∈ S. Then, M1 = yt + 1 − t, M2 = M4 = t, and M3 = 1. We
consider two subcases: t > 0; t = 0. If t > 0, then M4 > 0 and we are in case 1
of Step 3. Thus, the procedure stops and yields z′ = 0 as output. If t = 0, then
M1 > 0,M3 > 0 and M2 = M4 = 0. Hence, we are in case 3 of Step 3 with
J = {2}, I0 = {2, 4} and the procedure restarts with Step 0, with Fn replaced
by FJ = (E2|H2) = (B|A) and An replaced by AJ = ([α2, β2]) = ([y, y]).
(2nd) Step 0. The constituents associated with (B|A,C|A), contained in A, are
C1 = ABC,C2 = AB¬C,C3 = A¬BC,C4 = A¬B¬C. The starting system is{
λ1 + λ2 = y(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4), λ1 + λ3 = z(λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4),
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 1, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4 .
(7)
(2nd) Step 1. We set z = 0 in System (7) and obtain{
λ2 = y, λ1 + λ3 = 0, λ4 = 1− y, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4 . (8)
As y ∈ [0, 1], System (8) is always solvable. Thus, we go to the following:
(2nd) Step 3. We denote by Λ and S the vector of unknowns (λ1, . . . , λ4) and
the set of solution of System (8), respectively. By recalling the conditioning
events H2 = A and H4 = A, we consider the following linear functions Φi(Λ):
Φ2(Λ) = Φ4(Λ) =
∑
r:Cr⊆A
λr = λ1 +λ2 +λ3 +λ4. We set Mi = maxΛ∈S Φi(Λ),
i = 2, 4. From System (8), we obtain: Φ2(Λ) = Φ4(Λ) = 1, ∀Λ ∈ S. Then,
M2 = M4 = 1. We are in case 1 of Step 3 of the algorithm; then the procedure
stops and yields z′ = 0 as output.
To summarize, for any (x, y, t) ∈ [0, 1]3 on (C|B,B|A,A|(A ∨ B)), we have
computed the coherent lower bound z′ on C|A. In particular, if t = 0, then z′ = 0.
Moreover, if t > 0 and t(1−x+xy) ≤ 1−x, that is xy− (1− t)(1−x)/t ≤ 0, we
also have z′ = 0. Finally, if t(1−x+xy) > 1−x, then z′ = xy − (1− t)(1 − x)/t.
Computation of the upper probability bound z′′ on C|A.
Input and Step 0 are the same as in the proof of z′.
Step 1. We set z = 1 in System (2) and obtain

λ2 + λ4 = 0,
λ1 + λ5 = x(λ1 + λ5 + λ6),
λ1 = y(λ1 + λ3), λ1 + λ3 = t,
λ1 + λ3 + λ5 + λ6 = 1,
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6 ,
⇐⇒


λ1 = yt, λ3 = t(1 − y),
λ2 = λ4 = 0,
λ5 = x− xt+ xyt− yt,
λ6 = (1− x)[1− t(1 − y)],
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6 .
(9)
As (x, y, t) ∈ [0, 1]3, we observe that: yt ≥ 0, t(1− y) ≥ 0, and (1− x)[1− t(1−
y)] ≥ 0. Thus, System (9) is solvable if and only if x + xyt − xt − yt ≥ 0, i.e.,
t(x + y − xy) ≤ x. We distinguish two cases: (i) x + xyt − xt − yt < 0; (ii)
x+ xyt− xt− yt ≥ 0. In Case (i), System (9) is not solvable and—according to
the algorithm—we proceed to Step 2. In Case (ii), System (9) is solvable and
we go to Step 3.
Case (i). We take Step 2 and consider the following linear programming
problem: Compute z′′ = max(λ1 + λ3), subject to the constraints in (4). As x+
xyt− xt− yt < 0, that is t(x+ y− xy) > x ≥ 0, it holds that t > 0. In this case,
the constraints in (4) can be rewritten as in (5). Since x + xyt− xt− yt < 0, it
holds that x + xyt − xt < yt ≤ y. Thus, we obtain the maximum of (λ1 + λ3)
subject to (5) at (λ
′′
1 , λ
′′
3 ) = (xy − x+ x/t, 1− y). The procedure stops and yields
the following output : z′′ = 1− y − x+ xy + x/t = (1− x)(1 − y) + x/t.
Case (ii). We take Step 3 of the algorithm. We denote by Λ and S the vector
of unknowns (λ1, . . . , λ6) and the set of solution of System (9), respectively. We
consider the functions given in (6). From System (9), we obtainM1 = yt+1− t,
M2 = M4 = t, and M3 = 1. If t > 0, then M4 > 0 and we are in case 1 of
Step 3. Thus, the procedure stops and yields z′′ = 1 as output. If t = 0, then
M1 > 0,M3 > 0 and M2 = M4 = 0. Hence, we are in case 3 of Step 3 with
J = {2}, I0 = {2, 4} and the procedure restarts with Step 0, with Fn replaced
by FJ = (E2|H2) = (B|A) and An replaced by AJ = ([α2, β2]) = ([y, y]).
(2nd) Step 0. This is the same as the (2nd) Step 0 in the proof of z′.
(2nd) Step 1. We set z = 1 in System (2) and obtain{
λ1 = y, λ3 = 1− y, λ2 + λ4 = 0, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4 . (10)
As y ∈ [0, 1], System (10) is always solvable. Thus, we go to the following:
(2nd) Step 3. Like in (the 2nd) Step 3 of the proof of z′, we obtainM4 = 1. Thus,
the procedure stops and yields z′′ = 1 as output.
To summarize, for any assessment (x, y, t) ∈ [0, 1]3 on (C|B,B|A,A|(A ∨
B)), we have computed the coherent upper probability bound z′′ on C|A. In
particular, if t = 0, then z′′ = 1. Moreover, if t > 0 and t(x + y − xy) ≤ x, that
is (x+ y− xy) ≤ x
t
⇐⇒ x
t
− x− y+ xy ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (1− x)(1− y) + x
t
≥ 1, we also
have z′′ = 1. Finally, if t(x + y − xy) > x, then z′′ = (1 − x)(1 − y) + x
t
. This
concludes the proof of the following:
Theorem 3. Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and (x, y, t) ∈
[0, 1]3 be a (coherent) assessment on the family
(
C|B,B|A,A|(A ∨ B)
)
. Then,
the extension z = P (C|A) is coherent if and only if z ∈ [z′, z′′], where
[z′, z′′] =
{
[0, 1], t = 0;
[max{0, xy − (1− t)(1− x)/t},min{1, (1− x)(1 − y) + x/t}] , t > 0 .
5 Weak transitivity involving (negated) defaults
By Remark 3, the p-consistent knowledge base (B |∼ C,A |∼ B) neither p-entails
A |∼ C nor p-entails A |∼/ C. This will be denoted by (B |∼ C,A |∼ B) 2p A |∼ C
and (B |∼ C,A |∼ B) 2p A |∼/ C, respectively.
Theorem 4. (B |∼ C,A |∼ B,A ∨B |∼/ ¬A) |=p A |∼ C.
Proof. By Remark 3, the knowledge base K = (B |∼ C,A |∼ B,A ∨ B |∼/ ¬A)
is p-consistent. Based on Remark 2, we set IK = {1} × {1} × ]0, 1] and FK =(
C|B,B|A,A|(A∨B)
)
. Let P be any precise coherent assessment on FK such that
P ∈ IK, i.e., P = (1, 1, t), with t ∈]0, 1]. From Theorem 3, the interval of coherent
extensions from P on FK to C|A is [z′P , z
′′
P ] = [1, 1]. Then, by Equation (1), the
set of coherent extensions to C|A from IK on FK is
⋃
P∈IK
[z′P , z
′′
P ] = [1, 1] . ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. (B |∼ C,A |∼/ ¬B,A ∨B |∼/ ¬A) |=p A |∼/ ¬C.
Proof. By Remark 3, the knowledge base K = (B |∼ C,A |∼/ ¬B,A ∨ B |∼/ ¬A)
is p-consistent. Based on Remark 2, we set IK = {1} × ]0, 1]× ]0, 1] and FK =(
C|B,B|A,A|(A ∨ B)
)
. Let P be any precise coherent assessment on FK such
that P ∈ IK, i.e., P = (1, y, t), with y ∈]0, 1] and t ∈]0, 1]. From Theorem 3,
the interval of coherent extensions from P on FK to C|A is [z′P , z
′′
P ] = [y, 1].
Then, by Equation (1), the set of coherent extensions to C|A from IK on FK
is
⋃
P∈IK
[z′P , z
′′
P ] =
⋃
(y,t)∈]0,1]×]0,1][y, 1] =]0, 1] . Therefore, the set of coherent
extensions on ¬C|A is [0, 1[. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. (B |∼ C,A |∼ B,B |∼/ ¬A) |=p A |∼ C.
Proof. It can be shown that the assessment [0, 1]3 on (C|B,B|A,A|B) is totally
coherent. Then, K = (B |∼ C,A |∼ B,B |∼/ ¬A) is p-consistent. We set IK =
{1} × {1} × ]0, 1] and FK =
(
C|B,B|A,A|B
)
. We observe that A|B ⊆ A|(A ∨
B), where the binary relation ⊆ denotes the well-known Goodman and Nguyen
inclusion relation between conditional events (e.g., [12]). Coherence requires that
p(A|B) ≤ p(A|(A ∨ B)). Let P be any precise coherent assessment on FK such
that P ∈ IK, i.e., P = (1, 1, w), with w ∈ ]0, 1]. Thus, for any coherent extension
P ′ = (1, 1, w, t) of P on (FK, A|(A ∨ B)), it holds that 0 < w ≤ t. Then,
K′ = (B |∼ C,A |∼ B,B |∼/ ¬A,A ∨B |∼/ ¬A) is p-consistent. Thus, by Theorem
4, K′ |=p A |∼ C. Then, for every coherent extension P
′′ = (1, 1, w, t, z) of P ′
on (FK′ , C|A) it holds that z = 1. By reductio ad absurdum, if for some z < 1
the extension (1, 1, w, z) on (FK, C|A) of P ∈ IK on FK were coherent, then—
with 0 < w ≤ t and z < 1—the assessment (1, 1, w, t, z) on (FK′ , C|A) would be
coherent, which contradicts the conclusion z = 1 above. Thus, for every coherent
extension (1, 1, w, z) of P ∈ IK on (FK, C|A) it holds that z = 1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. (B |∼ C,A |∼/ ¬B,B |∼/ ¬A) |=p A |∼/ ¬C.
Proof. The proof exploits Theorem 5 and is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.
6 Concluding remarks
Our definition of negated defaults, based on imprecise probabilities (Sect. 3),
can be seen as an instance of the wide-scope reading of the negation of a condi-
tional. It offers an interesting alternative to the narrow-scope reading, where a
conditional is negated by negating its consequent [15]. Moreover, we note that
Theorem 4 can be seen as a modern formalization of the classical (Aristotelian)
syllogistic Modus Barbara (with A ∨B |∼/ ¬A, i.e. P (A|(A ∨ B)) > 0, as an ex-
istential import assumption). Likewise, Theorem 5 as Modus Darii. A different
(stronger) existential import assumption (B |∼/ ¬A, i.e. P (A|B) > 0) for Modus
Barbara and Modus Darii is considered in theorems 6 and 7, respectively. We
are currently working on a coherence-based probability semantics for classical
syllogisms, where we exploit ideas presented above.
References
1. Baioletti, M., Capotorti, A., Galli, L., Tognoloni, S., Rossi, F., Vantaggi, B.: CkC-
package; version e5. www.dmi.unipg.it/~upkd/paid/software.html (2009)
2. Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., Prade, H.: Nonmonotonic reasoning, conditional objects
and possibility theory. Artificial Intelligence 92, 259–276 (1997)
3. Biazzo, V., Gilio, A.: A generalization of the fundamental theorem of de Finetti
for imprecise conditional probability assessments. International Journal of Approx-
imate Reasoning 24(2-3), 251–272 (2000)
4. Biazzo, V., Gilio, A., Lukasiewicz, T., Sanfilippo, G.: Probabilistic logic under
coherence, model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and default reasoning in System P.
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 12(2), 189–213 (2002)
5. Bonnefon, J.F., Da Silva Neves, R., Dubois, D., Prade, H.: Qualitative and quanti-
tative conditions for the transitivity of perceived causation:. Annals of Mathematics
and Artificial Intelligence 64(2-3), 311–333 (2012)
6. Coletti, G., Scozzafava, R.: Probabilistic logic in a coherent setting. Kluwer, Dor-
drecht (2002)
7. Coletti, G., Petturiti, D., Vantaggi, B.: Coherent T-conditional possibility en-
velopes and nonmonotonic reasoning. CCIS, vol. 444, pp. 446–455. Springer (2014)
8. Dubois, D., Godo, L., Lo´pez De Ma`ntaras, R., Prade, H.: Qualitative reasoning
with imprecise probabilities. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems 2(4), 319–
363 (1993)
9. Freund, M., Lehmann, D., Morris, P.: Rationality, transitivity, and contraposition.
Artificial Intelligence 52(2), 191–203 (1991)
10. Gilio, A.: Probabilistic reasoning under coherence in System P. Annals of Mathe-
matics and Artificial Intelligence 34, 5–34 (2002)
11. Gilio, A., Ingrassia, S.: Totally coherent set-valued probability assessments. Ky-
bernetika 34(1), 3–15 (1998)
12. Gilio, A., Sanfilippo, G.: Probabilistic entailment in the setting of coherence: The
role of quasi conjunction and inclusion relation. IJAR 54(4), 513–525 (2013)
13. Gilio, A., Sanfilippo, G.: Quasi conjunction, quasi disjunction, t-norms and t-
conorms: Probabilistic aspects. Information Sciences 245, 146–167 (2013)
14. Gilio, A., Sanfilippo, G.: Conditional random quantities and compounds of condi-
tionals. Studia Logica 102(4), 709–729 (2014)
15. Pfeifer, N.: Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis: Towards an experimental philosophy
of conditionals. The Monist 95(2), 223–240 (2012)
16. Pfeifer, N.: Reasoning about uncertain conditionals. Studia Logica 102(4), 849–866
(2014)
17. Pfeifer, N., Kleiter, G.D.: Framing human inference by coherence based probability
logic. Journal of Applied Logic 7(2), 206–217 (2009)
18. Pfeifer, N., Kleiter, G.D.: The conditional in mental probability logic. In: Oaksford,
M., Chater, N. (eds.) Cognition and conditionals, pp. 153–173. Oxford Press (2010)
